





























THE SUPREME COURT'S SECURITIES ACT REFERENCE 
FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE AN UNDERSTANDING OF 
THE CANADIAN CAPITAL MARKETS 
Poonam Puri * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a decision released on December 22, 2011, the Supreme Court 
of Canada unanimously rejected the federal government's pro-
posed Securities Act. 1 Using a formalistic federalism analysis, the 
court held that the proposed Securities Act as currently constituted 
. . . 2 ts unconst1tutwnal. The court held that day-to-day regulation of 
securities is under provincial authority, while the regulation of 
systemic risk and data collection is appropriately under the federal 
government's general trade and commerce power. 3 The court notes 
that a co-operative federalism approach is a way to establish a 
national regime.4 
My reaction to the Supreme Court's decision is one of surprise 
and disappointment The decision was extremely decontextualized; 
the court failed to appreciate the nature of a "market" and that it is 
comprised of buyers (investors) in addition to sellers (issuers). The 
court also failed recognize the fact that the Canadian capital 
markets have evolved such that it is now national in character, and 
no longer local or regionaL In comparing this decision to other 
reference cases over the last 22 years, I also reach the conclusion 
that the court had the tools to find in favour of a national 
securities regulator, but avoided doing so, in part, by stating that it 
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Reference re: Securities Act (Can.), 2011 sec 66. 
In a similar line of reasoning, the Alberta Court of Appeal and a majority of the 
Quebec Court of Appeal also held the act is beyond the authority of the federal 
government: Reference re: Securities Act (Canada), 2011 ABCA 77, per Slatter 
J.A., Cote, Conrad, Ritter and O'Brien JJ.A., concurring; Quebec ( Procurl'urc 
genera/e) v. Canada ( Procureure genera/e), 2011 QCCA 591, per Robert C.J.A. and 
per Forget, Bich and Bouchard JJ.A. (Dalphond J.A. in dissent). 
Supra, footnote 1, at para. 128. 
Ibid., at para. 132. 
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critique of the court's decision and reasoning, I believe that a 
national securities regulator is still possible and a goal worth 
pursuing. 
This commentary is divided into three parts. First, I critique the 
decision of the court from a capital markets perspective. Second, I 
put the decision in context by comparing it to other reference 
decisions before the Supreme Court over the last 22 years. Third, I 
discuss options moving forward for national regulation of the 
Canadian capital markets in light of the Supreme Court's decision. 
II. CRITIQUE OF THE DECISION FROM A 
CAPITAL MARKETS PERSPECTIVE 
The court's decision is highly decontextualized and it does not 
demonstrate a clear understanding of the evolution and current 
state of capital markets in Canada. 
The court characterized Canada's central claim as follows: 
"[T]he securities market has evolved from a provincial matter to a 
national matter affecting the country as a whole."5 On this issue, 
the court held that Canada "has not shown that the securities 
market has so changed that the regulation of all aspects of 
securities now falls within ... s. 91(2)."6 The court cited a lack of 
evidentiary support for Canada's claim that capital markets have 
been transformed since their initial establishment. 7 
The court's statement that there was a lack of evidentiary 
support is puzzling, given the evidentiary record. The court had the 
benefit of expert reports by Professors Trebilcock and Milne filed 
by Canada as well as the handful of expert reports on securities 
regulator structure that have been produced in Canada over the 
last several decades. Instead of relying on these sources, the court 
held that the expert evidence confirms the local nature of Canada's 
securities industry.8 The court cites Suret and Carpentier's article 
on issuer headquarters:9 
J.M. Suret and C. Carpentier, for example, point to different focuses and 
specializations from province to province (Securities Regulation in Canada: 
Re-examination of Arguments in Support of a Single Securities Commis-
sion (2010), Reference Record, vol. IX, 8). Mining listings compose 
approximately two thirds of the securities market in British Columbia. 
5. Ibid., at paras. 4 and 33. 
6. Ibid., at para. 6 (emphasis added). 
7. Ibid., at para. 116. 
8. Ibid., at para. 127. 
9. Ibid. 
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About half of Ontario's securities market is attributable to large financial 
services companies. Alberta is the dominant national market for oil and gas 
and roughly a quarter of technology listings emanate from Quebec. 
My own research for the 2003 Wise Persons Committee also 
confirms that there are clusters of industry specialization across the 
country. 10 It is accurate to state that British Columbia and Ontario 
host a high proportion of mining issuers, Alberta hosts a high 
proportion of oil and gas issuers, and Ontario hosts a high number 
of financial services issuers. However, the province in which the 
issuer is headquartered determines who the primary regulator is 
(and hence, where the regulatory expertise in mining, or oil and gas 
are located), but not much else. The reality for many issuers is that 
their investors are located throughout Canada, with nationwide or 
international and gross domestic product impact. 11 The location of 
the headquarters of an issuer does not determine where the market 
is and provides little explanatory benefit to understanding the 
scope of the capital markets. 
It is more telling that two-thirds of reporting issuers in Canada 
are reporting in more than one jurisdiction, meaning that they are 
raising capital in more than one jurisdiction. 12 Companies with 
large market caps are typically national reporting issuers. Ninety-
eight percent of Canadian market capitalization is allocated to 
large cap companies. 13 
Interestingly, only Dalphond J.A. of the Quebec Court of 
Appeal held, in dissent, that capital markets are now national in 
nature. 14 Dalphond J.A. states "[There is] a Canada-wide 
integrated capital market, where transactions are essentially 
interprovincial and international, a situation radically different 
from the one that existed in 1867 or even 15 years ago." 15 
Dalphond J .A.'s dissent appears firmly rooted in the prevailing 
discourse on the nature of capital markets. How is it possible that 
10. See my paper on local and regional market interests for the Wise Person's 
Committee: Poonam Puri, "Local and Regional Interests in the Debate on 
Optimal Securities Regulatory Structure" (October 7. 2003), online: Wise 
Person's Committee, <http://www.wise-averties.cajreports/WPC_6.pdf>. 
II. Ibid. 
12. Wise Person's Committee, "It's Time" (Ottawa, Department of Finance, 2003), at 
p. 5, online: Wise Person's Committee, <http://www.wise averties.cajreports/ 
WPC%20Final.pdf>. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Quebec ( Procureure genera/e) v. Canada ( Procureure generate}, supra, footnote 
2. at paras. 395-545. 
15. Ibid., per Dalphond J.A., at para. 465. 
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only Dalphond J.A. came to this conclusion that is so well 
supported by the expert evidence on capital markets? 
The answer to this question lies in how the issue was framed by 
the court. The court framed the issue as a purely. federalism 
analysis where it would not delve into policy questions or political 
matters. This approach results in a decision that does not 
appreciate the current state of capital markets in Canada and 
does not chart a clear path forward for effective securities 
regulation for the benefit of all Canadians. 
Ill. COMPARISON WITH OTHER REFERENCES 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 
To put the court's Securities Reference decision in context, I 
compared this reference decision to other reference decisions 
released by the Supreme Court since 1990. Upon comparison, I 
have observed that this decision is out of step with other major 
reference decisions in the application of the constitutional principle 
of a "living tree." In addition, the court's refusal to delve into 
policy issues or political matters is in sharp contrast to other 
significant reference decisions. 
In the Securities Reference, the court reaches the conclusion that 
the proposed Securities Act sought to regulate the day-to-day 
activities of issuers and other participants in the securities market 
and that court held that "[t]hese matters have long been considered 
local concerns subject to provincial legislative competence over 
property and civil rights." 16 This decision essentially sends the 
message that this is how we have always done it and therefore, we 
are going to continue in this way. This type of reasoning is 
problematic from a capital markets perspective as noted in Part II 
of this commentary above; it is also out of step with the 
constitutional principle of a "living tree." 17 
Since 1990, there have been 22 reference decisions released by 
the Supreme Court of Canada. Ten of those decisions have been on 
issues related to federalism. In a number of these decisions the 
court has put the relevant issue in its full social, political' and 
economic context and acknowledged changes in norms, practices 
16. Supra, footnote I, at para. 6. 
17. An overview of the living tree doctrine of constitutional interpretation is available 
in: Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. supp., vol. 1. 
(Scarborough, Ont., Thomson Carswell, 2007) (updated 2011, rei. 1), at 15.9(1). 
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and conventions over time. Additionally, the court has dealt with 
policy issues and political matters either explicitly or implicitly. 
For example, in the 2004 Reference re: Some-Sex Marriage, the 
Supreme Court takes an explicitly more contextual approach. In 
that decision, the court outlines that marriage is not a fixed 
concept in constitutional law and that it is insufficient to consider 
how marriage was conceived at the time of Confederation, but 
instead how it stands today. 18 Under the heading "The Meaning of 
Marriage Is Not Constitutionally Fixed," the court wrote: 19 
The "frozen concepts" reasoning runs contrary to one of the most 
fundamental principles of Canadian constitutional interpretation: that our 
Constitution is a living tree which, by way of progressive interpretation, 
accommodates and addresses the realities of modern life. 
In holding that the concept of marriage has changed from being 
"between a man and a woman" to between two people, the court 
recognized the changes in relationships in modern society. In the 
Securities Reference, it appears that the court departed from 
understanding the "realities of modern life." In determining that 
the Canadian capital markets are local in nature, the court ignores 
the reality and the evidence that, for the most part, the Canadian 
market for capital is national in character and increasingly 
international in nature. 
The court also seeks to avoid the issue of deciding on optimal 
regulation stating that the court is not deciding whether a national 
securities regulator is more effective from a policy standpoint:20 
[T]he policy question of whether a single national securilies scheme is 
preferable to multiple provincial regimes is not one for the courts to decide. 
Accordingly, our answer to the reference question is dictated solely by the 
text of the Constitution [and] fundamental constitutional principles ... 
Whether the capital markets can be effectively regulated at the 
provincial level or whether federal regulation is necessary is indeed 
a policy question, but it is a policy question that requires the court 
to arbitrate. In other references, the court has dealt with issues that 
can only be reasonably considered to be policy issues and political 
matters and the court has addressed them explicitly or implicitly. 
For example, in the Secession Reference,21 the court was asked 
whether Quebec could unilaterally separate from Canada. The 
18. Reference re: Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, at paras. 21-26. 
19. !hid., at para 22. 
20. Supra, footnote 1, at para. 10. 
21. Reference re: Secession of Quebec, [1998]2 S.C.R. 217. 
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court's decision provides a clear example of addressing matters of 
policy and politics. The court held that a referendum on a clear 
question that confirmed a desire for Quebec sovereignty establishes 
a "duty to negotiate" between the government of Quebec, the 
Government of Canada and other relevant parties. The extensive 
reliance on a duty to negotiate was particularly surprising since the 
concept was not argued by any of the parties.22 Creating a duty to 
negotiate on the parties after a unilateral declaration of 
independence, when this was not even argued by the parties, could 
not be reasonably considered to be anything other than the court 
engaging in a policy decision in relation to a political matter. 
IV. REALISTIC OPTIONS MOVING FORWARD ON 
NATIONAL REGULATION OF CAPITAL MARKETS 
While earlier parts of my commentary critique the decision and 
the court's reasoning, this part of the commentary focuses on next 
steps and where we can reasonably go to from here. I will briefly 
discuss three possible options: (i) the status quo with provincial 
territorial regulation and a passport system; (ii) a national 
regulator narrowly focused on systemic risk; and (iii) a national 
regulator with a broad mandate achieved co-operatively with the 
"willing" provinces. 
The problem with the status quo is that it is ineffective. While 
the Passport system achieves some efficiencies for issuers, there is 
still no single voice to represent Canada internationally and no one 
final decision-maker who runs the system and is accountable. 
Under the current system, enforcement issues both in the 
regulatory and criminal spheres continue to be problematic. 
A second option would be to pursue a federal securities 
regulator that focuses on systemic risk. The Supreme Court 
indicated that a federal scheme aimed at systemic risk and national 
Canada-wide data management would be constitutionally valid. 23 
This approach would require the drafting of federal legislation that 
is much narrower in scope and mandate than the Securities Act 
that was put before the court. In my view, this approach would 
require focusing on exactly what systemic risk means and how best 
to manage it. We would also need to give more thought on how 
systemic risk materializes in different ways. Presumably a national 
22. Patrick 1. Monahan, "The Public Policy Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
the Secession Reference" (1999), 11 N.J.C.L. 65, at p. 66. 
23. Reference re: Securities Act (Can.), supra, footnote 1, at paras. 117 to 121. 
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regulator based on systemic risk should regulate issuers, inter-
mediaries and/or and transactions that are above a certain size, 
scope or complexity and that are likely to cause concerns about 
systemic risk. Would issuers in certain industries be automatically 
regulated by this regulator? Would issuers above certain market 
capitalizations be regulated by this regulator? Which types of 
instruments and/or products would this regulator oversee? Would 
the regulator articulate specific, bright-line rules which would lay 
out which participants and products will be subject to its 
regulation or will the regulator rely on more general but less 
certain principles for the scope of its regulatory reach? My concern 
with this narrow approach to federal regulation based on systemic 
risk is that it would create a 14th regulator in the capital markets 
and not directly address the issues of accountability, duplication, 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness that cause us concern with the 
current system. 
Finally, the third option for a way forward would be to engage 
in a co-operative federalism solution with the federal government 
negotiating a mutually acceptable solution with the provinces. The 
court recommends that the parties take a co-operative approach to 
meeting this federalism challenge. 24 As I understand it, this is 
precisely what the federal government and the Canadian Securities 
Transition Office have been doing to date, even though the 
legislation before the court was more absolute about the federal 
government's role in the proposed new environment. Of all the 
options available after the Supreme Court's decision, I believe this 
option is the best one moving forward. Even if a national securities 
regulator is restricted to the federal government and the "willing 
provinces," it will allow for greater accountability, actual decision-
making authority, and more effective and efficient enforcement. 
This will result in Canadian capital markets that are more 
competitive, more efficient and fairer and that will better protect 
investors. 
24. /hid., at para. 132. 
